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Abstract   
Taxes account for an important cost to businesses and their shareholders, so in order 
to reduce the tax burden actions are taken by the companies. By using different 
methods to capture tax aggressiveness and founding family presence we are going to 
find if family owned firms are more tax aggressive than non-family counterparts. 
Potential penalties imposed by IRS are likely higher to family owners than CEOs in 
non-family firms, thus family owned firms are concerned about reputation and 
penalties. This sometimes forces family firms into a non-aggressive methodology.  
In this dissertation, we investigate the factors contributing to a firm’s level of tax 
aggression. Specifically, using a sample of 291 US listed firms, we model the level of 
tax aggression as a function of the score of each firm in each of the three important 
firm-specific variables (a) the Return on Assets (ROA); (b) the index of Property, Plant 
and Equipment; and (c) the index of Leverage. We estimate an econometric model for 
binary dependent variable (the probit model), where the dependent variable is the level 
of tax aggression of each firms, as it is measured by the average ratio of tax expense to 
net profit, over the period 2005-2013. The results indicate that, by far, the most 
important factor for a firm’ tax aggression, irrespective of its current level of it, has to 
do with the firm’s level of leverage. Further, the effect is more pronounced in the case 
of family-controlled firms, over the aspect of leverage and ROA.  Using a panel-data 
approach, and a between-estimators way of estimating a fixed-effects model we find 
that that family ownership has no effect on tax aggressiveness, after controlling for the 
effect of leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), capital assets (PPE), and firm size 
(SIZE).  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since corporate taxes represent a sizeable expense for companies and their 
shareholders, the companies’ executives should take actions in order to minimize the 
corporate tax burden. The idea of minimizing the corporate tax burden could boil down 
choosing tax aggressiveness as corporate policy benefiting shareholders.  
 
1.2 AIM AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES OF THE DISSERATION 
This dissertation examines the extent to which family-controlled firms are more or 
less tax aggressive compared to non-family-controlled firms.  
In a family-controlled firm the founding family (of the firm) has kept to key 
executive positions in the company’s board (see Anderson et al. (2003)). Also, in a 
family-controlled firm the founding family controls at least five percent (5%) of the 
company’s equity capital (Chen et al. (2010) 
 
According to Chen et al. (2008), tax aggressiveness is the “downward management 
of taxable income through tax planning activities”. These activities could be legal or 
illegal, both aiming at the minimization of the corporate tax burden.  
The most obvious benefit from engaging in a tax-aggressive behavior is, presumably, 
the savings on the company’s tax bill (see Scholes et al. (2005)), a benefit which could 
accrue to the firm’s shareholders in the form of higher distributed cash dividends. 
Against these benefits of tax agression, the company’s executives should place the 
potential costs of such corporate behavior. The obvious cost here is the higher future 
tax bill, augmented by the interest on the company’s initial tax liability, in the IRS 
overturns the company’s tax positions. Actually, the company’s executives should 
consider not the value of this potential future tax liability, but its expected value, that 
is, they should also estimate how likely is for their firm to be audited by the tax 
authorities (Chen et al., 2010).  
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There are two ways to quantify empirically the extent of tax aggressiveness on the 
part of a company (Chen et al., 2008). The first way involves employing the so-called 
“effective tax rate”, namely, the proportion of total tax expense to pre-tax income, and 
the second is to make use of the “cash effective tax rate”, that is, the proportion of 
cash taxes paid to pre-tax profit.  In theory, a more tax-aggressive firm will tend to 
have consistently low cash effective tax rates.   
 
The hypotheses that shall be considered are the following  
• Taxes represent a significant cost and a reduction in cash flows leading firms and 
shareholders to reduce taxes. 
• When deciding tax aggressiveness, decision makers weigh the benefits and costs. 
• There is a conflict between managerial benefits and owner benefits. 
• Family owned companies may actually be less tax aggressive despite the notion that they 
have the most benefit. 
 
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERATION  
This dissertation consists of four chapters, including the introductory one. Chapter 2 
discusses the econometric methods and the evidence found in similar studies. Chapter 3 
introduces the data used in the dissertation, and it develops the empirical approach. 
Chapter 4 presents empirical findings of the study, and Chapter 5 concludes the study. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The chapter starts with an allusion to the three types of a firm’s tax policy, namely tax 
avoidance, tax aggressiveness, and tax risk (Section 2.1).  Then, in the following two 
sections (Section 2.2. and Section 2.3) an extensive discussion follows on two 
important papers in the literature  
 
2.1 TAX POLICIES AND FIRM RISK  
Guenther et al. (2010) in their study distinguished among three concepts related to a 
firm’s tax-policy, namely, among the concepts of tax avoidance, tax aggressiveness, 
and tax risk.  All these policies were discussed in their study because, according to the 
authors, they are related, in one way or another, with corporate risk, measured by the 
volatility in stock returns.   In what follows, we touch on each type of tax policy, and 
we also allude to the variables used to quantify a given type of tax behaviour.  
 
2.1.1 Tax Avoidance and the Effective Tax Rate  
Tax avoidance can defined as the firm’s attempt to reduce its current tax liabilities, 
in an “appropriate” way; this implies that tax authorities would call into question or 
make the firm to revise these practices (see Higgins et al. 2012). The typical example 
of a tax-avoidance activity is that of the use of corporate tax shield in order to reduce 
their tax liabilities. Other examples of tax-avoiding behavior involve use of off-shore 
tax havens (Desai and Dharmapala , 2004).  
According to Dyreng et al., (2008) a firm’s tax-avoidance behaviour can be proxied 
by its cash Effective Tax Rate (ETR), i.e. the proportion of its cash tax-liabilities to it 
profit before tax (see Sub-Section 3.1.1). The extent of tax avoidance could be revealed 
depending on whether the aforementioned ratio remains low consistently over time. In 
other words, a tax-avoidance policy is consistent with a low ETR ratio over time. 
Guenther et al. (2013), in their study, estimated the ETR as the ratio of the sum of 
cash-taxed paid over a period of five years to the sum of the sum of the profit before 
tax (without any special items) over the same period.  
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2.1.2 Tax Aggressiveness 
In contrast with tax avoidance, tax aggressiveness is the firm’s attempt to reduce its 
current tax liabilities, in an “inappropriate” way, that is in way, that the tax authorities 
would call into question these practices in the future (Guenther et al., 2013).  Put 
differently, a tax-aggressive behaviour on the part of the firm essentially involves a 
kind of earnings manipulation (Desai and Dharmapala, 2004). According to Guenther 
et al. (2013) a tax-aggressive corporate behaviour, exemplified whenever a firm 
manages to maintain a low effective tax rate or a high reserve for unrecognized tax 
benefits, is associated with increased corporate risk, thereby requiring firms to provide 
risk-taking incentives to managers.  
Guenther et al. (2013), in their study, proxied tax aggressiveness using the ratio of 
unrecognized tax benefits1  to the lagged value of total assets  
 
 
Figure 2-1 shows  framework for corporate tax planning. The relevant tax constructs 
discussed, and which are depicted in the top half of the figure, are, tax avoidance, tax 
aggressiveness, tax sheltering, and tax evasion. Apart from the general notion of 
effective tax planning, all constructs of explicit tax planning are further arranged along 
the dimensions of legality and compliance. These dimensions represent the presumable 
degree of lawfulness and perceived compliance of the tax actions likely captured by the 
individual tax constructs. The legality dimension ranges from perfectly legal, over 
increasingly “grey-scaled”, to clearly illegal with an intent to defraud. The dimension 
of compliance stretches from strict compliance, over potentially tax system unfavorable 
noncompliance, to apparent noncompliance. 
The bottom of Figure 2/1 1 provides some tangible examples for tax actions, which 
may be subsumed under the corresponding constructs, for example, the investment in 
tax-favored assets, the choice of a specific depreciation method, opting to defer taxable 
revenue to future assessment periods, the classification of certain transactions as “tax 
                                                 
1 Compustat code: TXTUBEND 
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exempt”, the shift of income between different tax jurisdictions (e.g. tax havens), 
engaging in tax-relevant transfer pricing, or the setting up particular tax shelter 
structures. 
 
Figure 2-1: An Overview of Corporate Tax Planning  
 
2.1.3 Tax Risk  
The third tax policy concept examined is that of tax risk, which refers to the 
uncertainty, i.e. volatility, of a company’s future tax liabilities. Naturally, a firm’s tax 
liabilities will vary from year to year for a number of reasons, like for example changes 
in tax laws of the country, or the extent to which a firm consistently and effectively 
(i.e. without its tax positions being overturned by the tax authorities) engages in a tax-
aggressive corporate behaviour. At any rate, the variation in the firm’s tax bill should 
be taken into consideration during the estimation of the company’s free cash flows.   
 
 
2.2 THE STUDY OF  CHEN ET AL (2010) 
Chen et al. (2010), using a panel consisting of 1,003 American companies listed in the 
S&P 1500 index (the index consists of the S&P 500, S&P Mid Cap 400, and the S&P 
Small Cap 600 indices) over the period 1996-2000, thus yielding a total of 3,865 firm-
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year observations, investigated whether family-controlled firms are less tax aggressive 
than non-family controlled firms. There were 1,790 firm-year observations (in the 
sampled data) corresponding to family-firms, and in 1,140 cases of these observations 
the way the founding family controlled the firm was through the position of the firm’s 
CEO. 
The authors made use of four ratios in order to measure the level of a firm’s tax-
aggressiveness. Among these measures, one was the Effective Tax Rate (ETR), i.e, the 
ratio of “total tax expense” to “pretax income”, and the other was the Cash Effective 
Tax Rate (cash ETR), namely, the ratio of “cash taxes paid” to “pretax income”.  
The econometric model they used involved a cross-sectional model, where the 
dependent variable, i.e. a measure of tax aggressiveness, was regressed against the 
following (continuous and binary) explanatory variables.  
Continuous Explanatory Variables  
• The return on assets (ROA) defined as the ratio of the company’s operating 
income to lagged total assets.  
• The firms’ level of Property, Plant, and Equipment as a proportion of lagged 
assets.  
• The firm’s level of intangible assets scaled by lagged assets.  
• The firm’s leverage defined as the ratio of long-term debt to lagged total assets.  
• The firm’s level of foreign income as a proportion of the firm’s lagged total 
assets.  
• The firm’s equity income in earnings as a proportion of lagged assets.  
• The natural logarithm of the company’s market value of its equity (at the 
beginning of year), as a proxy for the effect of size.   
• The market-to-book ratio (at the beginning of year), that is, the ratio of the 
market value of equity to its book value.   
• A variable capturing the firm’s book-tax difference.  
Binary Explanatory Variables  
• A dummy variable to capture the effect of family control on the level of tax 
aggression; this variable took on the value 1 for family firms, zero for non-
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family. Alternatively the binary variable was defined in a way so that it takes 
on the value 1 if founding family controlled at least 5% of the company and 
zero otherwise.  
• A dummy variable to capture the effect of loss-carry forwards; the binary 
variable took on the value of 1 if the loss carry forward, as of the beginning of 
the year, was positive and zero otherwise.   
 
There were various interesting results from this study, and we shall report only those 
related to the current dissertation. To begin with, it was found that, based on two 
measures of tax aggressiveness, family-controlled firms were less tax aggressive 
compared with non-family controlled firms. For example, the Effective Tax Rate 
(ETR) of family-controlled firms was 0.5% higher than the corresponding rate for the 
non-family-controlled firms. This difference was even higher in the case of the cash 
ETR, as a measure of tax aggressiveness; the cash ETR of family-controlled firms was 
1.2% higher than the corresponding rate for the non-family-controlled firms.  
The effect of ROA on the extent of tax aggressiveness was not clear. On the one 
hand, based on the ETR, the effect of ROA on tax aggressiveness was positive and 
statistically significant, while, on the other hand, based on the cash ETR, the effect of 
ROA on tax aggressiveness was negative and statistically significant.  This implies that 
using the ETR, as the metric of tax aggressiveness, the authors found that the higher 
the firm’s profitability, the lower the extent of its tax aggression, while using the cash 
ETR, as the metric of tax aggressiveness, the exact opposite conclusion can be reached, 
that is, the higher the firm’s profitability, the higher the extent of its tax aggression.   
When it comes to the effect of PPE (Property, Plant, and Equipment) on the extent of 
tax aggressiveness the results of the study were more conclusive. That is, based both on 
the ETR and the cash ETR, as a measure of tax aggressiveness, the effect of PPE was 
found to be negative but with different statistical significance. On the one hand, based 
on the cash ETR, the effect of PPE on tax aggressiveness was negative and statistically 
insignificant, while, on the other hand, based on the cash ETR, the effect of PPE on tax 
aggressiveness was negative and statistically significant.  At any rate, these findings 
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imply higher the firm’s level of capital assets, the higher the extent of its tax 
aggression.   
Also, the effect of Leverage on the extent of tax aggressiveness was not conclusive. 
On the one hand, based on the ETR, the effect of leverage on tax aggressiveness was 
found to be positive but not statistically significant, while, on the other hand, based on 
the cash ETR, the effect of leverage on tax aggressiveness was found to be negative 
and statistically significant.  This implies that using the cash ETR, as the metric of tax 
aggressiveness, that (according to the authors’ findings) the higher the firm’s leverage, 
the higher the extent of its tax aggression.   
Finally, the effect of size on the extent of tax aggressiveness was also somewhat 
conclusive. That is, based both on the ETR and the cash ETR, as a measure of tax 
aggressiveness, the effect of firm size was found to be negative but with different 
statistical significance. Namely, on the one hand, based on the cash ETR, the effect of 
size on tax aggressiveness was negative but statistically insignificant, while, on the 
other hand, based on the ETR, the effect of size on tax aggressiveness was negative and 
statistically significant.  At any rate, these findings imply higher the firm’s size, the 
higher the extent of its tax-aggressive behavior.   
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2.3 THE STUDY OF  GUENTHER ET AL (2013) 
Guenther et al. (2013) studied how the three concepts of tax policy, namely tax 
avoidance, tax aggressiveness, and tax risk are related to the overall risk a firm might 
take on. Using three criteria, an unbalanced panel-data sample was mustered consisting 
of 2,376 firms (from the Compustat database), observed over various years (from a 
minimum of 2 years to a maximum of a 20 years), thereby yielding 16,686 company-
year observations. 
The authors used for the measurement of tax avoidance the cash Effective Tax Rate 
(cash ETR), defined as “the ratio of the sum of the cash tax payments over a five-year 
period to the sum of income before taxes and special items over the same five-year 
period”. For the measurement of tax aggression the authors made use the ratio of 
unrecognized tax benefits to lagged total assets.   
Then using these variables, they constructed a limited dependent variable, which was 
taking on the value of 1, an indication of a high level of Tax Avoidance, if the 
observation was in the lowest quintile of the distribution of cash ETR and zero 
otherwise. Also, constructed another limited dependent variable, which was taking on 
the value 1, in this case an indication of a high level of Tax Aggression,  if the 
observation was in the higher quintile of the distribution of scaled unrecognized tax 
benefits and zero otherwise.  
The above limited dependent variable was regressed against the following 
explanatory variables.  
Explanatory Variables  
 
• The firms’ level of Property, Plant, and Equipment as a proportion of lagged 
assets.  
• The firm’s size  
• The firm’s level of foreign sales (from geographic segments) as a proportion of 
total sales;  
• The firm’s level of spending on Research and Development (R&D) as a proportion 
of lagged assets;  
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• The firm’s level of Intangible Assets as a proportion of lagged assets  
• The level of long-term debt to lagged total assets.  
 
 
The results of the study revealed that, among other things, corporate tax avoidance 
has a positive and statistically significant association on the firm’s size, level of 
Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE), expenditures on Research and Development 
(R&D), and leverage. Likewise, the corporate tax aggressiveness was found to have a 
positive and statistically significant association with the firm’s size, level of Foreign 
Sales, and expenditures on Research and Development (R&D), while a negative and 
statistically significant relationship was found between tax aggressiveness and firm’s 
level of Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE).  
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3 METHODOLOGY  
3.1 DEFINITION OF THE DEPEDENT VARIABLE AND ECONOMETRIC 
APPROACH  
 
3.1.1 Measuring Tax Aggressiveness  
To develop the model that will be used in order to model tax aggressiveness, we start 
with the definition of latter. 
In line with Chen et al. (2010), we measure (the level of) tax-aggressiveness,𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡, of 
firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡, as the proportion cash outlays in tax expenses (ctaxexp) to the firm’s 
profits before taxes (preprofit).  
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =
ctaxexp𝑖,𝑡
preprofit𝑖,𝑡
 3.1  
 
In the literature (for example see Dyreng et al. (2008)) the above ratio (which, as we 
have pointed out in the introduction, it is known as the “Cash Effective Tax Rate” 
(cash ETR), is measured annually, by calculating the ratio of the sum of cash tax 
outlays during a five-year period to the sum of (positive) profits before tax during the 
aforementioned period. 
3.1.2 Modelling Tax Aggressiveness in a Panel-Data Econometric Model 
Since we deal with panel data, we need first to specify a panel-data econometric 
model. To this end, and in line with the work of Chen et al. (2010), the following basic 
fixed-effects model (i.e. a type of a panel-data model), shall be estimated to the study’s 
panel:   
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝐗′𝑖𝑡𝛃 + 𝚳′𝑖𝑡𝛄 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 3.2  
Where  
TA : A measure of tax aggressiveness, defined previous as the cash Effective Tax Rate (ETR)  
𝐗: A column-vector with firm-specific variables, which are assumed to affect the level of 
tax aggressiveness   
𝛃:  A column-vector of the coefficients of the firm-specific variables.   
 12 
𝐌:  A column-vector of macroeconomic variables, which may be associated with the firms’ 
level of tax aggressiveness.  
 𝛄: A column-vector of the coefficients of the macroeconomic variables,   
𝛼𝑖 : A variable capturing the unique and firm-specific fixed-effects.  
𝜀𝑖𝑡:  The disturbance term for each cross-section 𝑖 and time period 𝑡. 
 
The term 𝛼𝑖 represents a firm-specific variable, which differs among firms, but for any particular 
firm, its value over the time dimension of the panel is constant.  Put differently, the unobserved 
factor 𝛼𝑖, which is supposed to affect the level of a firm’s tax aggressiveness does not change over 
time for each company, and hence any changes in extent of tax-aggressive witnessed in each of 
these firms must be down either to the effect of time-varying firm-specific variables in 𝐗, or to the 
effect of time-varying macroeconomic variables in 𝐌. At the same time, the implicit assumption 
in the fixed-effects variables 𝛼𝑖 (for𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁 firms) are correlated with the regressors in 𝐗 or 
𝐌.   
The objective in the panel-data model (3.2) is not so much to quantify the fixed-effects  𝛼𝑖, but 
to get estimates for the parameters 𝛽𝑘 in the coefficients’ vector 𝛃 for the firm-specific explanatory 
variables. Table 3-1 shows the explanatory variable corresponding to the various coefficients of 
vector 𝛃 and the expected signs of the estimates for each  coefficient parameter.  
Table 3-1: List of Explanatory Variables and their Expected Signs 
Type of Variable Name of Variable Symbol Used 
Study/Expected or 
Documented effect 
on TA 
FIRM-SPECIFIC 
VARIABLES 
Return on Assets ROA (-)/(+) 
Total Leverage  LEV (-)/(+) 
Fixed Assets  PPE (-) 
Firm Size  SIZE (-) 
 
 
There are several firm-specific variables that the relevant literature (see for example Dyreng et 
al. 2008; Frank et al. 2008; Rego 2003;)has shown to affect a firm’s level of tax-aggressiveness. 
The above table shows that the firm-specific variables that will be used in this study are ROA, 
PPE, LEV, and SIZE capturing corporate aspects such as firms’ profitability, capital assets, 
leverage, and size.   
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A firm’s profitability, as this is captured by its Return on Equity (ROA) is related to tax 
aggressiveness, since research has shown (see for example Anderson and Reeb (2003)) that the 
higher a firm’s profitability and the lower the loss-carry forwards, the higher effective tax rates.  
The level of  firm’s Plant, Property, and Equipment (PPE) is relevant for our purposes, since, 
normally, a firm with a rather highly capital-intensive production needs to consider carefully the 
different ways to estimate the depreciation expense, it is allowed to make, thereby reducing its tax 
liability, as the depreciation expense is tax-deductible expense.  
Finally, a firm’s Size (size) is included as a control variable since large firms are 
likely to invest more, than smaller firms, toward setting up sophisticated tax 
departments in an effort to minimize their tax bill (Guenther et al. ,2013)  
 
In this study two way shall be used in order to estimate the fixed-effects model  shown 
in Eq. (3.2). As it was previously pointed out, the objective here to derive estimates for 
the parameters 𝛽𝑘 in the coefficients’ vector 𝛃 for the firm-specific explanatory 
variables, after eliminating the effect of the fixed-effects variables 𝛼𝑖. So, two ways of 
eliminating the fixed-effects (in model (3.2)) shall be discussed. The first is the within 
estimator and the second if the between estimator.   
. . . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  
. . . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . .  
. . . . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . . . . .  . . .  
Estimation of the Fixed-Effects Model with the Within Estimator  
One way to eliminate the fixed-effects parameters 𝛼𝑖 (i.e. to eliminate the variation of tax 
aggressiveness at the higher-level unit of the firm) is to estimate model (3.2) with the within 
estimator. 
To derive the within-estimator model, we first take the average of Eq (3.2) over time for each 
company 𝑖 (i.e. the higher-level unit); this averaging process yields the following:  
𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + ?̅?′𝑖𝛃 + ?̅?′𝑖𝛄 + 𝜀?̅? 3.3  
Note, the fixed-effects 𝛼𝑖, due to their time-invariance, have an average value equal to their 
actual values, that is, ?̅?𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖, for 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁. And subtracting Eq. (3.3) from Eq. (3.2) we get 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 = (𝐗
′
𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?′𝑖)𝛃 + (𝚳
′
𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?′𝑖)𝛄 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅? 3.4  
Changing the notation, we could write the above econometric model as  
𝑇?̈?𝑖𝑡 = ?̈?
′
𝑖𝑡𝛃 + ?̈?
′
𝑖𝑡𝛄 + 𝜀?̈?𝑡 3.5  
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Where 𝑇?̈?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 is the time-demeaned data on the explanatory variable 𝑇𝐴. This fixed-
effects transformation, shown by Eq. (3.5), is the so-called the within-estimator model. In the 
above model, any time-invariant characteristic (like the fixed effects 𝛼𝑖) has become irrelevant in 
determining the parameters 𝛽𝑘 in the coefficients’ vector 𝛃 for the firm-specific explanatory 
variables.  
 
Estimation of the Fixed-Effects Model with the Between Estimator  
The estimation of the fixed-effects model using the between estimator, essentially involves an 
OLS estimate of the following cross-sectional regression model (for company 𝑖) 
 
𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 = 𝛽0 + ?̅?′𝑖𝛃 + ?̅?′𝑖𝛄 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀?̅? 3.6  
The difference with model (3.3) is than a constant term 𝛽0 has been added to the model. So, 
according to the between-estimator model (3.6), using the time-averages for 𝛵𝛢 (the dependent 
variable), 𝐗 (the vector of firm-specific variables), and  𝐌 (the vector of macroeconomic variables) 
we run a cross-sectional regression. Consistent estimation of model (3.6) requires that the new 
disturbance term (𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀?̅?) is not correlated with the average value of the explanatory variables 
contained either in vector 𝐗 or in vector 𝐌, otherwise the estimation of the between-estimator 
model (3.6) will yield biased estimates of the parameters {𝛽𝑘, 𝛾𝑗} in the coefficients’ vectors  𝛃 
and 𝛄.  
 In the above between-estimator model, we could also include a dummy variable as follows   
𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿fam𝑖 + ?̅?′𝑖𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀?̅? 
 
3.7  
Where 
fam: A binary variable taking on the value of 1 for family-controlled firms, and zero 
otherwise; family control is established if family ownership is  greater or equal to 5% of 
total firm equity.   
 
So, for family-controlled firms, i.e. for firms with fam𝑖 = 1, the above between-estimator model 
becomes  
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𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿 + ?̅?′𝑖𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀?̅? 
 
3.8  
While, for non-family-controlled firms, i.e. for firms for which fam𝑖 = 0, the between-estimator 
model (3.6) becomes  
𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 = 𝛽0 + ?̅?′𝑖𝛃 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀?̅? 
 
3.9  
Hence in the econometric specification (3.6), the object of interest is on the slope parameter 𝛿 of 
the dummy variable fam, which captures the effect of family control on practices of tax-
aggressiveness on the part of the different types of firms. Given that 𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 stands for the average 
cash ETR for firm 𝑖,over the time dimension of the panel, and that high (low) values of 𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 indicate 
a low (high) level of tax aggression, we see that if family-controlled firms (i.e. firms for which 
fam𝑖 = 1),we see that  if family-controlled firms are less tax aggressive compared to non-family-
controlled firms, i.e when 𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝜖𝑓 > 𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝜖𝑓′  (where 𝑓 represents the set of family-controlled firms 
and 𝑓′ the set of non-family-controlled firms) , then a positive sign on the parameter 𝛿 is expected.  
By contrast, if family-controlled firms are more tax aggressive compared to non-family-controlled 
firms, i.e if 𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝜖𝑓 < 𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝜖𝑓′, then a negative sign on the parameter 𝛿 should be expected.   
 
Note, in model (3.7), the inclusion of control variables, that is, of the firm-specific variables that 
have been shown to be correlated with the tax aggressiveness on the part of the firms, ensures that 
the differences, if any, in the level of tax aggression between family-controlled and non-family-
controls firms are not attributed to other factors, besides the type of firm ownership.  
 
3.1.3 Modelling the Probability of Engaging in a Tax-Aggressive Behavior  
In modelling the probability of engaging in a tax-aggressive behavior we define the (observed) 
dependent variable 𝑌𝑖 as a binary variable, having only two possible outcomes: 0 (if the firm is 
tax aggressive ) and 1 (if the firm is no tax-aggressive). Hence {𝑦𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑁  is the set of realizations for 
this variable, and these realizations are affected by a set 𝐗𝑖of explanatory variables. In our case we 
deal with 𝑁 = 291firms under consideration. The binary realizations in {𝑦𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑁  occur according 
to the following observability rule  
𝑦𝑖 = {
1     if 𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0
0   otherwise
} 3.10  
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Under the above 𝑦𝑖
∗ is the latent realization of the latent variable 𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝑓(𝐗𝑖, 𝑈𝑖; 𝛃), for which 
we assume the following linear model holds true, 
𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝐗′𝑖𝛃 + 𝑈𝑖 3.11  
where  
𝑈𝑖: The unobserved disturbance term for the ith  realization,  and 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁  
 
According to the above observability rule (3.10), and the specification for the latent variable 
𝑌𝑖
∗we obtain  
   Pr 1i i u iY G  X X β  3.12  
 
where  
 uG • :  The cumulative distribution function for the disturbance term 𝑈𝑖 
 
By specifying an appropriate distribution function for 𝑈𝑖  and by knowing the values of 𝛃 we 
can estimate the probability that 𝑌 = 1. Assuming a normal distribution, with zero mean and unit 
variance, for the disturbance term 𝑈𝑖, that is,  𝑈𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑈
2), we get  
 
 Pr 1 ii i
u
Y

 
   
 
X β
X  3.13  
where  
Φ(∙):  The standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf)  
 
Since there is an infinity of combinations of values 𝛃  and 𝜎𝑈
2 , it is customary to adopt that 
scaling convention 𝜎𝑢
2 = 1. The above model for estimating the probability that 𝑌 = 1 is known 
as the probit model.  
 
 
 
3.2 DATA  
The data used in this study are panel data, that is, they form a combination of cross-
section and time-series data. The cross-sectional component of the data involves the 
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291 American firms, while the time-series component involves the years of the period 
2005-2012. The source of our data concerning the family-controlled  businesses are 
derived from the Global Family Business Index, an index comprising the largest 500 
family firms around the globe.  The index is compiled by the Center for Family 
Business at the University of St.Gallen, Switzerland, in cooperation with EY's Global 
Family Business Center of Excellence. 
Fig. 3-2 presents the how average value of the measure of tax aggression varies 
across the companies (i.e. the cross-sections of the panel) over the time dimension of 
the panel.  
 
Figure 3-1: Average Cash Effective Tax Rate (ETR) for the Companies in the Sample  
 
The measure of tax aggression used is the ratio of cash tax expense to pre-tax income. In Fig. 3-
2 the average value of the aforementioned ratio across the 291 firms was 5.74% with a very high 
standard deviation of 5.67% 
 
Table 3-2 reports the composition of the sample, which consists of 2,633 firm-years 
from 1,003 firms, spanning the period 2005-2012. Of the 2,633 firm-year observations 
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in the sample, 1,132, that is, about 43% are family-firm observations,  and the 
remaining are non-family firm observations 
Panel A of Table 3-2 presents the descriptive statistics of firm-specific variables, 
separately family-controlled firms, while Part B reports the same descriptive statistics 
separately for non-family-controlled firms. One thing that stands out right away is  that 
family firms seem to be less tax aggressive than non-family firms, as their effective tax 
rate was higher than that of non-family controlled firms by 0.21%. Further, in line with 
previous research (like that for example of Anderson and Reeb (2003)), the ROA for 
family-controlled firms is higher than that of non-family controlled; the mean ROA for 
family controlled firms is 3.55%, while the mean ROA for non-family-controlled firm 
is 3.16%. Also, we see that family firms have higher leverage (with a mean leverage of 
0.1951) compared with non-family firms (with a mean leverage of 0.10), they are less 
capital intensity (with a mean PPE ratio of 71.79%  compared with a corresponding 
ratio of 73.8% for non-family controlled firms), and in general they are smaller than 
non-family firms; the average size for family-controlled firms was 4,975, while the 
average size for nonfamily-controlled firms was 5,801. 
Table 3-2: Summary Statistics 
Part A 
 
FAMILY CONTROLLED  
Tax LEV PPE ROA PRICE SIZE 
Min. 0 -118.648 9.385 0.1195 0.31 37.44 
1st Qu 1.004 -3.8263 45.84 0.8507 22.15 618.65 
Median 3.069 0.5121 65.586 1.6069 35.3 1702.28 
Mean 5.032 0.1951 71.798 3.5661 40.37 4975.21 
3rd Qu 7.438 5.9382 91.276 4.4182 53.37 5536.75 
Max. 19.95 63.7022 264.077 80.2553 262.2 527309 
 
Part B 
 
NON-FAMILY CONTROLLED  
Tax LEV PPE ROA PRICE SIZE 
Min. 0 -455.857 11.6 0.108 0.41 71.48 
1st Qu 0.9509 -3.9782 44.91 0.7505 23.05 742.96 
Median 2.4088 0.8385 64.92 1.7364 34.94 1854.82 
Mean 4.8235 0.1021 73.81 3.1632 40.78 5801.94 
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3rd Qu 6.9349 6.5494 89.32 4.3801 50.95 4466 
Max. 19.9514 66.1173 978.49 21.8254 532.17 85963 
Notes: * statistically significant estimates at the 5% level of confidence. Lev (leverage)=  (debt /assets) 
PPE=(PPE/Assets)*100; ROA= (Op.Inc./ Assets)*100; Size = value of assets    
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2: Average Cash Effective Tax Rate (ETR)  in each year  
 
95% confidence interval around the mean 
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4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS  
Our goal is to model the dependent variable of tax aggressiveness with a panel consisting of 
339 American firms (cross sections), observed over 2005-2012. Tax-aggressiveness, 𝑇𝐴1𝑖,𝑡, is 
computed as the ratio of tax expense (taxexp) to pre-tax profits (preprofit). This measure, which 
is also known as the Effective Tax Rate (ETR).  The first approach in modeling this variable 
involves a panel-data approach and the second a probability approach through the estimation of a 
probit model  
 
 
4.1.1 The Panel Data Model  
Table 4-1 shows the estimated the fixed-effects model using the within-estimator approach (see 
model (3.5).  To see how the results of Table 4-1 can be interpreted, we examine the effect of ROA 
on the dependent variable, i.e. the ratio of tax expense to pre-tax income. We consider for example 
the effect of ROA on tax aggression in the case of family-controlled firms.  
 
Table 4-1: Estimation of Fixed-Effects Model with the Within Estimator 
Part A  
 
ALL FIRMS 
Explanatory Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
LEV 0.0032** 0.0033** 0.0036* 
PPE -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0007 
ROA -0.0534* -0.0543* -0.0554* 
SIZE  -0.0029 -0.0012 
Price   0.0000* 
    
    
 
Part B  
 
FAMILY  
Explanatory Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
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LEV 0.0005 0.0007 0.0013 
PPE -0.0047** -0.0046** -0.0061* 
ROA -0.0325** -0.0336** -0.0315** 
SIZE  -0.0031 -0.0021 
Price   -0.0001* 
    
    
 
Part C 
 
NON-FAMILY  
Explanatory Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
LEV 0.0035 0.0035 0.0036 
PPE 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 
ROA -0.1139* -0.1147* -0.1203* 
SIZE  -0.0025 -0.0004 
Price   0.0000* 
    
    
Notes: * statistically significant estimates at the 5% level of confidence. The estimated model is the within-
estimation model defined as   
𝑇?̈?𝑖𝑡 = ?̈?
′
𝑖𝑡𝛃 + 𝜀?̈?𝑡 
Where 𝑇?̈?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 is the time-demeaned data on the dependent variable 𝑇𝐴, and  ?̈?𝑖𝑡 = 𝐗𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 is the 
time-demeaned data on the vector 𝐗, containing the explanatory variables.  𝛽𝑘 in the coefficients’ vector 𝛃 
for the firm-specific explanatory variables.  
 
From Part C (Model 1) of Table 4-1, we see that in the case of non-family-controlled firms the 
estimated slope coefficient for the effect of the explanatory variable ROA, on the level of a firm’s 
tax aggressiveness, is -0.1139 (?̂?ROA,𝑓′ = −0.1139). The negative sign of the estimated slope 
coefficient  ?̂?ROA,𝑓′ shows that there is a negative relationship between the explanatory variable 
ROA and the dependent variable. And given that high (low) values of the dependent variable 𝑇?̈?𝑖𝑡 
(which represents the cash ETR of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑖) indicate a low (high) level of tax aggression, 
the negative relationship  between the firm’s ROA and 𝑇?̈?𝑖𝑡 shows that, for non-family-controlled 
firms, the higher the firm’s profitability, the lower the value of 𝑇?̈?𝑖𝑡, and thus the higher the level 
of tax aggression.  
Note in Part C, model 1, of Table 4-1 the effect of the explanatory variables LEV and PPE, on 
the level of a firm’s tax aggressiveness, is not statistically significant, and hence we may conclude 
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that for non-family-controlled firms, corporate leverage and the level of capital assets are not 
important in determining the effect of tax aggression.   
 
We could quantify the effect of ROA on the dependent variable, i.e. on the level of cash TRS, 
by using as a base-case change in the level of ROA the value of the semi-interquartile range in the 
distribution of ROA’s values. A variables semi-interquartile range (IQR) is computed as the 
difference between the value of 75th percentile (Q3) and the 25th percentile (Q1) of the distribution 
of the variable’s data values, and this difference is divided by two2.  
So for example, in the case of non-family firms the value of the third quartile for the variable 
ROA is Q3=4.38(see Table 3-1), while the value of the first quartile for the same variable is 
Q1=0.75, and hence the semi-interquartile range will be IQR=(4.45-0.75)/2=1.78. So, in the case 
of non-family firms for every 1.81 percentage-point increase of their ROA, their tax cash-expense 
(as a percentage of pretax income) is expected to fall by 20.67(= −0.1139 × 1.81) basis points.  
 
From Part B of Table 4-1, we see that the estimated slope coefficient for family firms is -0.0325;  
In the case of family firms we have the value of the third quartile for the variable ROA is Q3=4.42 
(see Table 3-1) while the value of the first quartile for the same variable is Q1=0.85, and hence the 
semi-interquartile range will be IQR=(4.42-0.85)/2=1.78. So, in the case of family firms for every 
1.78 percentage-point increase of their ROA, their tax cash-expense (as a percentage of pretax 
income) is expected to fall by 5.79 (= −0.0325 × 1.78) basis points.  
 
Table 4-2 shows the estimation results of the fixed-effects model using the between estimator. 
Hence we examine the effect of family ownership on tax aggressiveness, after controlling for the 
effect of other variables, which have been documented in the literature to have a bearing on the 
level of tax aggressiveness. What we need to notice is the statistical significance of the parameter 
of the dummy variable fam;  this binary variable is defined to take the value 1 for non-family-
controlled firms, and zero family-controlled firms, where family control is established if family 
ownership is  greater or equal to 5% or they hold positions in top management.   
                                                 
2 That is, we have IQR=(Q3-Q1)/2 
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Table 4-2: The Results of Estimating the Fixed-Effects Model with the Between Estimator 
Explanatory Variable  Model 1  Model 2  
(Intercept) 9.6311* 10.5370* 
LEV -0.0937 -0.0856 
PPE -0.0377* -0.0275* 
ROA -0.3735* -0.5092* 
Size   -0.0002* 
Fam -0.0960 0.0132 
?̅?2 0.20 0.35 
Obs 291 291 
Notes: * statistically significant estimates at the 5% level of confidence  
 
Since the estimated value of the parameter of the dummy variable fam in both model 
specifications (presented in the above table) is not statistically significant we conclude that family 
ownership has no effect on tax aggressiveness, after controlling for the effect of leverage (LEV), 
profitability (ROA), capital assets (PPE), and firm size (SIZE).  
The estimate for the effect of SIZE is negative and statistically significant, that is, the 
larger a firm’s size the lower the cash ETR and hence the greater the extent of tax 
aggression on the part of the firm. In other words, this finding indicates that larger 
firms invest more, compared with smaller firms, of their resources in developing 
sophisticate tax departments in order to maximize their tax savings.  
 
4.1.2 The Results from the Probit Model Estimates  
In Fig. 3-23 we saw that ratio of cash tax expense to pre-tax income (i.e. the measure of tax 
aggression used in the dissertation) had an average value (across the 291 firms) of 5.74% with a 
very high standard deviation of 5.67%, and a median value of 3.58%.  In order to apply the probit 
model (see Eq. (3.12)), we need first to construct the (observed) binary variable 𝑌𝑖, with two 
possible outcomes: 0 (if the firm is tax aggressive ) and 1 (if the firm is no tax-aggressive). 
Specifically, we assume that tax-aggressive firms are those with a mean ratio of cash tax expense 
to pre-tax income (𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖) less than the median value of 3.58%, and a non-tax-aggressive firms are 
those with a mean ratio of cash tax expense to pre-tax income greater or equal to the median value 
of 3.58%. So, the binary variable  𝑌𝑖 is constructed as follows  
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𝑌𝑖 = {
1 if   𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅𝑖 < 0.0358 (tax aggression) 
0 if   𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅𝑖 ≥ 0.0358   (no tax aggression)
} 
Hence the binary realizations {𝑦𝑖}𝑖=1
291  ,for the binary random variable 𝑌𝑖 , involve 146 values of 
0s (i.e. no tax-aggressive firms, for which the mean ratio of cash tax expense to pre-tax income 
(𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖) less greater than the median value of 3.58%), and 145 values of 1s (i.e. tax-aggressive firms, 
for which the mean ratio of cash tax expense to pre-tax income (𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖) was less than the median 
value of 3.58%).  
Table 4-3: The Results of Estimating the Probit Model  
Explanatory Variable  Model 1  Model 2  
(Intercept) -0.8946* -2.2420* 
LEV 0.0319** 0.0444** 
PPE 0.0058** -0.0032 
ROA  0.1378* 0.3460* 
Size   0.0004* 
Fam 0.1795 0.3582** 
?̅?2   
Obs   
Notes: * statistically significant estimates at the 5% level of confidence. ** statistically significant estimates at 
the 10% level of confidence The dependent binary variable 𝑌𝑖 , with two possible outcomes: 0 (if the firm 
is not tax aggressive ) and 1 (if the firm is tax-aggressive). Tax -aggressive firms are those with a mean 
ratio of cash tax expense to pre-tax income (𝑇𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖) less than the median value of 3.58%, and non-tax-
aggressive firms are those with a corresponding ratio greater or equal to the median value of 3.58%. LEV 
(leverage)=  (debt /assets)*100; PPE=(PPE/Assets)*100; ROA= (Op.Inc./ Assets)*100; Size = value of 
assets .   Fam (dummy variable) =1 for non-family-controlled firms, and zero otherwise; family control is 
established if family ownership is  greater or equal to 5% or they hold positions in top management, while 
“family” are considered the members of the founding family, either by blood or marriage.   
 
 
The estimated probit regression model shown under the heading Model 1 has the following 
representation  
P(Y𝑖 = 1̂|𝚾𝑖) = Φ(−0.8946 + 0.0319 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 0.0058 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 0.1378 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 0.1795𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖) 
 
For family firm (i.e. 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖 = 0) the above specification has as follows  
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P(Y𝑖 = 1̂|𝚾𝑖) = Φ(−0.8946 + 0.0319 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 0.0058 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 0.1378 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖) 
While for non-family firm (i.e. 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖 = 1) we have  
P(Y𝑖 = 1̂|𝚾𝑖) = Φ(−0.8946 + 0.1795 + 0.0319 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 + 0.0058 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 0.1378 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖) 
 
The positive (negative) sign of any slope coefficient 𝛽𝑗, associated with the firm-specific variable  
𝑋𝑗, indicates that the estimated probability that firm 𝑖 engages in a tax-aggressive behavior 
increases (decreases) as the values of the variable 𝑋𝑗increase.  
Next, we estimate the probability of engaging in a tax-aggressive behavior. We estimate this 
probability, for family-controlled and non-family- controlled firms, using as base values of the 
control variables (i.e. LEV, PPE, and ROA) their average value. In Table 3-2 we saw that family 
firms had a mean leverage of 0.1951, while for non-family firms the corresponding ratio was 0.10, 
and also the formers’ PPE ratio was 71.79%  compared with a corresponding ratio of 73.8% for 
the latter firms. Also, we know that the mean ROA for family controlled firms is 3.55%, while that 
for non-family-controlled firms is 3.16% (see Table 3-2).  
Substituting the average values of LEV, PPE and ROA into the equation for the family-
controlled firm we find that the probability that a family-controlled firm will engage in a tax-
aggressive behavior is 50.6%  
P(Y𝑖 = 1̂|𝚾𝑖) = Φ(−0.8946 + 0.0319 (0.1951) + 0.0058(71.79) + 0.1378 (3.55)) 
= Φ(0.0147) 
= 0.5058 
Likewise, substituting the average values of LEV, PPE and ROA into the equation for the non 
family-controlled firm we find that the probability that a nonfamily-controlled firm will engage in 
a tax-aggressive behavior is close to 56%  
P(Y𝑖 = 1̂|𝚾𝑖) = Φ(−0.8946 + 0.1795 + 0.0319 (0.10) + 0.0058(73.8)
+ 0.1378 (3.16)) 
= Φ(0.149) 
= 0.5592 
 
Note, in the probit regression specification 1, the estimate for the dummy variable 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖 is not 
statistically significant. This implies that the difference of 5.4 percentage points, between the 
probability that a nonfamily-controlled firm will engage in a tax-aggressive behavior (which is 
56%)  and the probability that a family-controlled firm will engage in a similar behavior (which is 
50.6%), is not considered to be statistically significant.    
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In the second model specification for probit regression model the estimated slope parameter for 
the dummy variable 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖 is in this case statistically significant; this model specification has the 
following representation  
P(Y𝑖 = 1̂|𝚾𝑖) = Φ(−2.24 + 0.0444𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 − 0.0032𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 0.346 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 0.0004𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖
+ 0.3582𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖) 
 
Again for the family-controlled firms, for which we have 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖 = 0, the above model 
specification becomes as as follows  
P(Y𝑖 = 1̂|𝚾𝑖) = Φ(−2.24 + 0.0444𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 − 0.0032𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 0.346 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖
+ 0.0004𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖) 
While for non-family controlled firms (for which we have 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖 = 1) the model specification is  
P(Y𝑖 = 1̂|𝚾𝑖) = Φ(−2.24 + 0.0444𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 − 0.0032𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 0.346 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 + 0.0004𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖
+ 0.3582) 
 
Again we estimate the probability of engaging in a tax aggressive behavior, for family-controlled 
and non-family- controlled firms, using as base the average values of all now firm-specific 
variables (i.e. LEV, PPE, ROA, and SIZE). As we previously pointed out the average values of 
LEV, PPE, and ROA for family-controlled firms were 0.1951, 71.79  and 3.55, respectively. 
Further, the average size for family-controlled firms was 4,975. For non-family firms the average 
values of LEV, PPE, and ROA were 0.10, 73.8% and 3.16%, respectively, while the average size 
for such firms was 5,801.  
 
Substituting the average values of LEV, PPE , ROA and SIZE into the equation for the family-
controlled firm we find that the probability that a family-controlled firm will engage in a tax-
aggressive behavior is 83%  
P(Y𝑖 = 1̂|𝚾𝑖) = Φ(−2.24 + 0.0444(0.1951) − 0.0032(71.79) + 0.346(3.55)
+ 0.0004(4,975)) 
= Φ(0.98) 
= 0.837 
 
Likewise, substituting the average values of LEV, PPE and ROA into the equation for the non 
family-controlled firm we find that the probability that a nonfamily-controlled firm will engage in 
a tax-aggressive behavior is close to 56%  
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Note, in the probit regression specification 1, the estimate for the dummy variable 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖 is not 
statistically significant. This implies that the difference of 5.4 percentage points, between the 
probability that a nonfamily-controlled firm will engage in a tax-aggressive behavior (which is 
56%)  and the probability that a family-controlled firm will engage in a similar behavior (which is 
50.6%), is not considered to be statistically significant.    
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5 CONCLUSIONS  
In this dissertation, we examined the determinants of tax aggression in a sample of family-
controlled and non-family controlled US firm. The variable that was used to capture the level of 
tax aggression was the ratio of cash tax expense to pretax income. In theory, family firms could be 
more tax aggressive compared to their non-family peer, if the owners enjoy greater tax-savings 
benefits.  Using a cross- sectionally averaged regression, with a dummy variable and control 
variables (firm-specific variables), we found that family ownership does not influence the level of 
the firms’ on tax aggressiveness, after controlling for the effect of firm-specific variable like 
leverage, profitability, capital assets, and firm size.  
 
The econometric approach involved the use of ordered probit model, in order to examine the 
determinants of tax aggression. 
 
Specifically, with the ordered probit we modeled the level of tax aggression of 339American 
firms (based on average values over the period 2005-2012), using as explanatory variables the 
score of each firms in three important firm-specific variables (1) the return on assets( ROA), (2) 
the PPE index   and (3) the leverage index .  
The level of tax aggression was measured by the firm’s tax-aggression scores over the period 
2005-2012. Specifically, the level of tax aggression of a firm could take one four distinct values 
ranging from 1, if that firm was ranked on the basis of its average level of tax aggression in the 
first quartile of all  American firms, to 4, if the firm was ranked the fourth quartile. From the 
estimation of the ordered probit model, all the coefficients of the explanatory variables, ie the 
ROA, the PPE index, and the leverage index, were found to be statistically significant, in 
determining the level of tax aggression.    
The estimation results showed that by far, for all levels of tax aggression, the leverage is the 
most important factor that they need to correct for.  
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